

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 RANGOO 03279 230538Z

12

ACTION EA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-01 INR-05 L-02

NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 AID-05 SAM-01 IO-10 /069 W

----- 084592

R 220645Z NOV 74

FM AMEMBASSY RANGOON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8817

INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

AMEMBASSY TOKYO UNN

USLO PEKING UNN

C O N F I D E N T I A L RANGOON 3279

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR BM CH JA

SUBJ: BURMESE ATTITUDES TO U.S.

REF: (A) STATE 252931

(B) RANGOON DAO IR 6-812-0079-74, OCT 3, 1974

1. NE WIN'S CRITICISM OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD BURMA COULD WELL BE VIEWED AS MOSTLY "BOILERPLATE". IT IS CONSISTENT WITH RECURRENT GUB PATTERN OF SEEKING TO DEMONSTRATE ITS EQUIDISTANCE FROM THE THREE GREAT MILITARY POWERS. NE WIN HAS BEEN CRITICAL OF US BEFORE, E.G., IN CERTAIN RECENT TOURS D'HORIZON WITH OTHER LEADERS, AND PROBABLY FEELS A PARTICULAR NEED TO PARADE HIS "INDEPENDENCE" FROM US AT THIS TIME, WHEN HE IS "OPENING UP" TOWARDS US IN SOME LIMITED WAYS. WE ARE INCLINED, AT THE VERY LEAST, TO SEE ENOUGH BOILERPLATE IN NE WIN'S REMARKS TO CAUSE US TO TAKE THEM AT A CONSIDERABLE DISCOUNT. WHEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES SEEM TO NE WIN TO CALL FOR A DESCRIPTION OF BURMA'S RELATIONS WITH THE POWERS, HE IS APT TO STRESS THE ASPECT OF EQUIDISTANCE.

2. WHILE THUS TAKING NE WIN'S CRITICISM AT A DISCOUNT, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF NON-BOILERPLATE REASONS FOR NE WIN TO BE UNHAPPY WITH  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 RANGOO 03279 230538Z

WHAT HE MAY ASSUME TO BE RECENT INDIRECT MANIFESTATIONS OF U.S.

POLICY. THE REAPPEARANCE OF PDP TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN RANGOON AND MANDALAY, USING U.S. MANUFACTURED GRENADES; ALLEGATIONS OF INVOLVEMENT OF AMERICAN NATIONALS WITH SHAN DISSIDENTS, NEWS REPORTS OF CLANDESTINE USG ACTIVITY IN CHILE IN SUPPORT OF ELEMENTS OPPOSED TO A "SOCIALIST" GOVERNMENT; THE THAI RELEASE OF ZAW SENG AND THEIR FAILURE TO TURN OVER JIMMY YANG; AND THE CONTINUING FLOW OF US-MADE ARMS TO INSURGENTS (LAOS BEING CURRENTLY THE MAJOR SOURCE, REPORTEDLY). IF RPT IF NE WIN WAS SEEKING TO CONVEY A MESSAGE TO US VIA TANAKA, IT PRESUMABLY WAS "STOP HELPING MY ENEMIES\*"

3. ONE ANSWER TO SUCH A HYPOTHETICAL MESSAGE MIGHT BE, "BUT WE ARE NOT HELPING YOUR ENEMIES. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS NOT TO BE BLAMED IF SOME CORRUPT LAOTIANS ARE ILLEGALLY DIVERTING ARMS SUPPLIED BY US; NOR DO WE CONTROL THE THAI JUDICIAL PROCESSES. AND WE CANNOT STOP INDIVIDUAL AMERICANS FROM SHOWING SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT FOR U NU, ETC., ETC." AT LEAST, NE WIN MIGHT WELL IMAGINE THAT THIS IS HOW WE WOULD ANSWER SUCH A MESSAGE, AND IT IS PRECISELY THIS THAT WOULD REMIND HIM OF THE PRC GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO GUB COMPLAINTS ABOUT CHINESE SUPPORT OF THE BCP. THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES, REPORTEDLY, SAY "DON'T BLAME US; THAT IS A PARTY RESPONSIBILITY." NE WIN WOULD PERHAPS PARAPHRASE OUR IMAGINARY ANSWER: "DON'T BLAME US; THOSE THINGS ARE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF OUR LAO AND THAI CLIENTS AND PRIVATE AMERICAN CITIZENS". SUCH A PARAPHRASE WOULD BE UNFAIR, BUT NOT ENTIRELY UNNATURAL.

4. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS FOR U.S. INTERESTS IS DEBATABLE. EVEN IF THE SUSPICIONS WERE GENUINE, IT IS NOT CLEAR HOW BURMESE NATIONAL BEHAVIOR WOULD BE AFFECTED. BURMA'S COMMITMENT TO THE NARCOTICS CONTROL EFFORT (A MAJOR U.S. INTEREST) REFLECTS IT AUTONOMOUS CONCERN WITH A BURMESE PROBLEM, NOT JUST FONDNESS FOR THE U.S. SIMILARLY, THE "OPENING UP" OF BURMA SEEMS LIKELY TO PROCEED AT A GRUDGING PACE, UNDER PROD OF ECONOMIC NECESSITY, AND THE DEGREE OF "ACCESS" WHICH AMERICAN INVESTORS ARE PERMITTED WILL DEPEND MUCH MORE ON THE COMMERCIAL AND ECONOMIC ATTRACTIVENESS OF WHAT THEY HAVE TO OFFER, THAN ON THE GUB'S APPRAISAL OF AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH THE DISSIDENTS. IF, AS SOME FEEL, THERE HAS RECENTLY BEEN AN ALMOST IMPERCEPTIBLE FURTHER SLOWING OF THE ALREADY GLACIAL TREND TOWARD "OPENING UP", AND IF THE VISIT OF THE BSPP DELEGATION TO THE USSR AND GDR HAS BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY AN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 RANGOO 03279 230538Z

UNUSUAL SPATE OF PRO-SOVIET PUBLICITY, IT WOULD BE A LITTLE PARANOID AT THIS STAGE TO READ INTO THIS AN EXPRESSION OF GUB DISPLEASURE WITH US (THOUGH IT MIGHT POSSIBLE REFLECT SOME ANNOYANCE WITH THE PRC). IF THE GUB, AS SEEMS LIKELY, ABSTAINS ON THE KHMER RESOLUTION IN THE UNGA, THIS WILL BE ENTIRELY IN LINE WITH BURMA'S PAST RECORD, RATHER THAN REFLECTING ANY NEW DISPLEASURE WITH THE U.S.

5. OF COURSE, IF THERE WERE A CONVENIENT WAY TO ALLAY BURMESE SUSPICIONS, IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA TO DO SO. FOR EXAMPLE, IF THERE WERE ANYTHING WHICH COULD HAVE PERSUADED THE GUB TO VOTE OUR WAY ON THE KHMER ISSUE, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN A CREDIBLE COMMITMENT ON OUR PART TO DRY UP THE ILLEGAL FLOW OF US ARMS FROM INDOCHINA AND GET THE THAI TO COOPERATE IN ISOLATING THE BURMESE INSURGENTS FROM EXTERNAL SUPPORT. SUCH A COMMITMENT IS OF COURSE IMPOSSIBLE. WE WOULD NEVERTHELESS RECOMMEND THAT THE DEPARTMENT AND OUR MISSIONS IN THAILAND AND INDOCHINA GIVE THOUGHT TO THE PROBLEM, AND SEE IF THERE ARE ANY LOW-COST STEPS (NOT EXCLUDING EVEN "COSMETIC" GESTURES) BY WHICH WE MIGHT WITHOUT SACRIFICE OF PRINCIPLE SHOW THE BURMESE THAT THE USG NOT ONLY IS NOT INVOLVED WITH THE DISSIDENTS BUT ALSO DISAPPROVES OF INVOLVEMENT ON THE PART OF ITS NATIONALS OR ALLIES. EMBASSY RANGOON CAN OF COURSE CONTINUE TO DENY TO THE GUB THAT THERE IS ANY SIGNIFICANT AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT, BUT OUR ABILITY TO ALLAY GUB SUSPICIONS WILL REMAIN INHERENTLY LIMITED, UNLESS OUR VERBAL ASSURANCES COULD BE BACKED UP BY DEEDS CLOSER TO THE SCENE OF ACTION.

OSBORN

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** POLICIES, DISSIDENT FACTIONS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 22 NOV 1974  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** KelleyW0  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1974RANGOO03279  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D740340-0132  
**From:** RANGOON  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1974/newtext/t19741120/aaaaaqiv.tel  
**Line Count:** 134  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION EA  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 3  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** (A) STATE 252931  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** KelleyW0  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 10 JUL 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <10 JUL 2002 by shawdg>; APPROVED <24 MAR 2003 by KelleyW0>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** BURMESE ATTITUDES TO U.S.  
**TAGS:** PFOR, BM, US, (NE WIN, U)  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005